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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the current regime in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act 1989 for police questioning of young people. The focus of this paper is on the rights 
guaranteed by that Act. The situation for young people before the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act will be considered, and the Act itself will be compared to 
the approach of other jurisdictions. The main question that is considered is whether, given 
developments in case law, those rights are also protected under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. In analysing that question considerable use is made of case law under the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The Law Commission's suggested changes to the 
common law regarding the admissibility of statements are also considered in this paper. 
Finally the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill will be 
examined. It is recognised that there are clear differences between the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act regime and the separate regime for young people under the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act. It is conceded that at present case law developments do 
not mean that young people would have the same rights under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act as they do under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. 
However it is contended that the Amendment Bill brings the separate regime closer to the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act regime. In that sense the separate regime for young people 
may become no longer necessary. 
Word Length 
The text ~f this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 15, OOO words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper will examine the rights set out in the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act 1989 which regulate police questioning of children and young people. 1 A 
fundamental question will be considered: do young people need, in a legal sense, the 
protection of a separate2 regime? This question looks at whether there are other 
protections available that would serve young people as well . 
This question will be approached in three ways. 
First, consideration will be given to what happened in New Zealand before the enactment 
of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989. The Children and Young 
Persons Act 1974, the common law and Police General Instructions will be analysed and 
there will be an assessment of how they served young people. 
Secondly, the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 will be examined. It 
will be compared with legislative developments in other jurisdictions. Case law will also be 
examined and compared with overseas developments. 
Thirdly, the rise of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the developments arising 
from Bill of Rights Act case law will be considered. This paper will look at the extensions 
that have occurred in this case law. Cases arising under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms will be used for predictions and comparisons. These developments in case 
law suggest a broadening of rights and a willingness by the Courts to take a purposive 
approach extending the reach of Bill of Rights Act protections. The changes to the 
common law proposed by the Law Commission3 will also be examined. The issue to be 
examined in this paper is whether those extensions would be enough to protect young 
people in the same way that they are protected now. In three key areas the differences 
between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act will be considered. 
The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill4
 provisions suggest a 
narrowing or blurring of the time when police have to tell young people of their rights. 
The new clause 3 lA blurs the nature of young peoples' rights. The Amendment Bill's 
provisions will be analysed. Given the trend reflected in the Amendment Bill it will be 
suggested that the developments in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act area could become 
increasingly significant for young people. The impact that the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
1 In this paper the term "young people/person" is to be assumed as also referring to children, except 
where explicitly stated. 
2 Young people also receive separate attention when it comes to sentencing, see s 142 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985. 
3 Preliminary Paper No.21 Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning- a Discussion Paper (1992) . 
4 The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill 1994 No.269-2. 
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Act would have if it was applied to young people who are questioned by the police will be 
analysed. 
It will be concluded that the Bill of Rights Act has travelled a long way since it was 
initially enacted and present trends may bode well for future flexibility of application. As 
yet the Bill of Rights Act would not provide the same protections for the young that they 
enjoy now. However, the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill 
reflects that for young people the protections enacted in 1989 may well be over. 
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II HISTORY 
A Introduction 
Before the enactment of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act young 
offenders did not enjoy the protection of a separate legislative regime when questioned by 
police. The Children and Young Persons Act 197 4 did not contain a provision specifically 
directed to that question, and section 29( I) of that Act allowed the court to admit any 
evidence it saw fit. Young people were protected in the same way as adults. A young 
person received the conventional adult caution when questioned by the police. If a young 
person made an admission or confession during an interview that admission was admissible 
evidence as long as it was voluntary, in the sense that there was no oppression (with the 
limited exception available in section 20 of the Evidence Act 1908
5 
), and fair. Devices 
such as the Judges' Rules6 were used to assess fairness . 
However there was some recognition of the special nature of interviewing young people. 
The police produced Police General Instructions 
7 which set out guidelines for officers to 
follow when interviewing young people in particular, although none of the guidelines had 
the force of law. 8 
B The Court as Protector 
Some of the cases indicate that before the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act the Courts cast a particularly careful eye over interviews with young people. 
In R v / 9 Williamson J held that Instruction C42 of the Police General Instructions which 
made it clear that so far as possible interviews conducted with young people should be in 
the presence of their parent, guardian or teacher' 0 
should not be honoured in its breach. 
5 Section 20 enables a court to admit an induced confession if the Judge is satisfied that the means by 
which the confession was obtained were not likely to have caused an untrue admission of guilt to be made. 
6 The Judges ' Rules are common law rules which regulate police conduct. A breach of the Judges ' Rules 
does not necessarily mean that evidence from an interview will be inadmissible; the Rules are general 
guidelines of fairness . The rule are "aids in determining the crucial question of police conduct" R v 
Convery [1968] NZLR 426, 441 per McCarthy J. 
' Note that in England the police still use a Code of Practice which sets out the procedure for interviewing 
both adults and young people. The Code of Practice is also governed by the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 but it is the document that sets out the practical procedure. Like the Police General Instructions 
the Code of Practice in England does not have the force of law. 
8 The General Instructions are part of the background fabric, they are a guide as to what is appropriate. 
Police Interviews of Young People Youth Law Project Inc, p 4. It is a matter of internal procedure and 
discipline for an officer to comply. 
9 (1987) 3 CRNZ 444. 
IO fbid, 445. 
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While the Police General Instructions did not have the force of law, Williamson J said that 
they were a vital protection and should not be ignored. A young man of 15 was 
questioned about his possible involvement in the shooting of his mother and two sisters. 
Williamson J said (obiter) that he appreciated the difficulty that the police would have had 
finding a family member to sit in on the interview, but that it was of concern that no 
efforts at all were made to find a supportive adult for the young person. On the facts 
Williamson J excluded three of the young man's replies from evidence because of 
unfairness. There had been cross-examination of the young man during the interview. 
Cross-examination is a breach of Rule 7 of the Judges' Rules. 
In Munro v Police 11 McGechan J excluded Munro's statement because of unfairness. The 
Police had breached several of the Judges' Rules . Munro had not been cautioned until his 
written statement was placed before him (breach of Rule 3), he was cross-examined and 
shouted at during the interview (breach of Rule 7), and the questions and answers were 
not fully recorded during the interview (breach of Rule 9). Special emphasis was given to 
Munro's age. McGechan J also expressed concern at the police failure to follow their 
General Instructions by making no attempts to contact the youth's parents. His Honour 
was scathing of police arguments that their Instructions were secret and sensitive and 
should not have been brought into argument. 12 
Questions of Police procedure and the rights of the young are too important to 
allow technical procedural questions to stand in the way.13 
In R v Webb (No. 2) 14 a 15 year old was interviewed in connection with the arson of his 
family home and the horrific murders of his mother and brother. The fire and the bodies 
were found shortly after midnight and Webb was interviewed for 7 and a half hours 
through the night. Webb's statement was excluded because of unfairness. Robertson J 
expressed his disquiet that the police had only made belated attempts to find a supportive 
adult for Webb. His Honour held that Webb was exhausted physically and mentally. Webb 
was not cautioned until his statement was read back to him 7 hours after the interview had 
begun. This was a clear breach of the Judge's Rules . Webb was particularly vulnerable and 
in Robertson J's view15 
[it was] the Court 's ""ider responsibility to 
ensure that a young person is not disadvantaged because of his youth. 
In R v Tuhua 16 the Court of Appeal emphasised the youth of the defendant saying17 
11 Unreported, 3 June 1988, High Court, Wellington Registry, AP79/88. 
12 Pursuant to section 61 A of the Police Act 1958 internal notices or circulars which might prejudice the 
maintenance of law, including the prevention, detection, and investigation of offences, are not to be 
released to the public. The Police General Instructions had already been released in an article in the 1980 
New Zealand Law Journal ; [1980] NZLJ 351. 
13 S ee above n 11 , p 3. 
14 (1988) 4 CRNZ 21. 
15 Ibid, 25. 
16 Unreported, 22 November 1988, CA272/88. 
17 [bid, 6. 
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It is obvious enough that particular care and sensitivity is necessary on the 
part of police interviewers if they are to fairly question immature young people. 
In R v Wilson 18 a 14 year old was accused of attempted rape. Once again the police failed 
to follow General Instructions and did not attempt to contact a supportive adult. There 
were several breaches of the Judges' Rules leading to the exclusion of the statement due 
to unfairness . Wilson was not cautioned (breach of Rule 2), and his statement was not 
recorded in writing (breach of Rule 9) . Williamson J held that in the context of a 14 year 
old being interviewed in the middle of the night without any caution or the assistance of a 
parent or adult it was "abundantly clear"
19 that the procedures were unfair and that the 
statement should be excluded. 
Those cases indicate that a "parental" or protective role was played by the courts
20 in a 
situation where a self-regulating procedure was failing to protect young people. However 
there was another tendency in the courts before the advent of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act, this was to assess whether the young person was 
"streetwise" enough to be unaffected by deficiencies in police conduct. 
C The Court as Assessor 
In R v Hemi21 Jeffries J held that the age of an accused is but one circumstance and that 
the Court should endeavour to assess the maturity of the accused. Jeffries J admitted a 
statement made by the accused in that case because he had a considerable fund of " street 
wisdom" and had handled the police officers in an aggressive and assured way. Hemi had 
been arrested at 1.55am after the discovery of a body in a suspicious fire. At 3.18am he 
confessed to murder. Hemi had requested his mother and a solicitor at the beginning of the 
interview, but at no stage were either made available to him. Jeffries J held that there was 
no conduct from the police that would suggest that Hemi needed that special protection 
and that he was not disadvantaged. Hemi ' s attitude did not indicate that he was overborne 
by an authority figure . The confession was admissible because as a matter of fact and 
degree it was voluntary and fair . 
This approach has also been taken in a number of overseas jurisdictions. In the US case 
Vance v Bordenkircher22 a confession to murder was held to be voluntary despite the 
defendant's age (17), mental disability and the duration of the 7 hour interview. The court 
held that the fact that there were no adults present was only due to the defendant ' s failure 
to request them. The police had not restricted him at all . The questioning was not unduly 
forceful and there were no tricks used. The defendant had been questioned by the police 
18 Unreported, 26 August 1986, High Court, Christchurch Registry, Tl8/86. 
19 Ibid, 4. 
20 See also R v Tuhua (above) n 16 where the Court of Appeal excluded a statement because of unfairness. 
Like the other cases there was cross-examination in breach of the Judges ' Rules and a failure by the police 
to allow the youth access to his family who had actually arrived at the station before the interview began. 
~I [19861 2 NZLR 116. 
22 692 F. 2d 978 (4th Cir 1982). 
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before and there was no reason to suggest that his will was overborne on this occasion. 
The interview was entirely fair . 23 In R v Legere24 a Canadian court held that although 
there had been a request for his parents the statement from the accused was admissible 
because he had been adequately advised of his rights and had not exercised them. The 
statement was full and voluntary and was not the result of any unfairness on the part of the 
police. In Australia the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal held in R v Crawford 
25 that 
each case involving a young person was to be examined on its own circumstances. 
Consideration was to be given to the age of the young person, the maturity of the young 
person, and the young person's ability to look after his or her own interests. 
This approach is open to criticism about the way that maturity or "streetwiseness" is 
assessed and the likelihood of error. This approach also suggests that the "streetwise" are 
entitled to less rights and a lesser standard of protection than others. 26 
D Conclusions 
Before the enactment of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act the 
approach of the Legislature, the police and the courts to police questioning of young 
people was fractured . The Legislature was simply inert, and the issue was left to the 
courts. The police saw their General Instructions as guidelines only, to be departed from 
where circumstances required it. The courts viewed the General Instructions strictly and 
used them in an assessment of whether an interview was fair. However the courts were 
divided over the approach to take; whether to look at the subjective features of the young 
person and to assess whether he or she would have been affected by deficiencies in police 
conduct, or whether to say that any deficiencies could not be justified. 
23 FE Inbau, J P Buckley and J E Reid Criminal Interrogations and Confessions (Williams and Watkins 
Ltd, Baltimore, 1986) 243-246 . 
24 (1989) 102 NBR (2d) 208: 254 APR 208 (QB). 
25 [1985] 2 Qd R 22 . 
26 Report of the A1inisteria/ Review Team of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
(Department of Social Welfare, Wellington, 1992) p 156. 
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III THE CHILDREN, YOUNG PERSONS, AND THEIR FAMILIES 
ACT AND OVERSEAS JURISDICTIONS 
A Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
J. Introduction 
The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act was enacted in 1989. The Act had 
its critics from the start, but it was the care and protection provisions in Parts II and III of 
the Act which were the focus of discussion, not Youth Justice in Part IV. During the third 
reading the Minister of Social Welfare the Hon. Dr Michael Cullen said 
27 
There was only very brief debate on the youth justice sections, and I think 
that is because there is a fair degree of unanimity among members about those sections 
The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act instituted a new regime. It was a 
unified approach initiated by the Legislature to be applied by the courts and the police in a 
defined way. 
2. Principles 
Part IV of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act deals with Youth Justice. 
The first section in that part, section 208, sets out the principles which guide and underpin 
the implementation of Part IV. 28 Those principles are subject to the overriding principles 
in section 5 which guide the whole of the Act. The principles in section 5 reflect the 
overall object or purpose of the Act which is (per section 4) 
to promote the well-being of children and young persons and their families and family groups. 
The principles in sections 5 and 208 reflect that object by focusing on the reintegration of 
young offenders and the involvement of family groups in decision making about young 
offenders. 29 
Section 208(h) sets the scene for the provisions in sections 215-226 which deal with the 
police questioning of young people. That guiding principle reads: 
27 
(h) The principle that the vulnerability of the children and young persons 
entitles a child or young person to special protection during any investigation 
relating to the commission or possible commission of an 
offence by that child or young person. 
NZPD vol 498, 10487, 16 May 1989. 
28 This format is used throughout the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, in Part II which 
deals with Care and Protection of Children and Young Persons, s l 3 sets out guiding principles. There are 
also General Principles which apply to the whole Act in ss 4 and 5. 
29 See particularly ss 5(2) and 208(c). 
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3. The provisions 
The procedure in sections 215-226 of the Act activates the principle in section 208(h). 
Section 215 sets out the basic rights of young people, and declares that young people must 
be informed of those rights before questioning.
30 Section 221 provides a concrete basis to 
those rights. Section 221 states that no oral or written statement from a young person will 
be admissible unless the rights in section 215 have been explained in an appropriate 
manner, the young person has had an opportunity to consult with a solicitor and/or any 
other person nominated by the young person, and the statement has been made in the 
presence of a solicitor and/ or another adult nominated by the young person ( or the police 
where the young person fails to nominate) pursuant to section 222. 
31 The rights cannot 
be merely read to a young person, they must be "explained" (sections 215-219). Section 
218 directs that the explanation of rights must be given in a manner and a language that is 
appropriate to the age and level of understanding of the young person. 
This places a lot of responsibility on the police to ensure that an understanding of the 
rights is achieved as far as possible. The procedure of an interview is also regulated by 
these sections in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. Unless a lawyer or 
acceptable nominated adult is present at an interview, the young person's statement will be 
inadmissible (section 221 ). 
Section 224 states that a statement will not be inadmissible under section 221 if there has 
been reasonable compliance with the requirements in section 221 . Interestingly, section 
225 expressly saves other enactments or rules of law relating to the admissibility of 
confessions, saying that they are not affected by the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act as long as they are not inconsistent. In R v Jrwin
32 Fisher J expressed the 
opinion that the rights provided by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 may have 
30 The exrplanations required by section 215 are the following : 
(i) The young person may be arrested if there is a power to arrest without a warrant pursuant to 
s 214, or for failure to give details such as name and address; 
(ii) The young person is not obliged to accompany the officer, and can withdraw agreement to 
accompany at any time; 
(iii) There is no obligation to make a statement; 
(iv) A statement may be used in evidence; 
(v) Consent to make a statement may be withdrawn at any time; and 
(vi) The young person is entitled to consult and have present a solicitor and any adult of their 
choice. 
Section 215 is set out in full in the Appendix to this paper. 
31 Note that pursuant to s 223 , s 221 does not apply where a statement is made spontaneously before there 
is a reasonable opportunity to comply. Also note that s 221 does not apply to certain transport offences 
(per s 233), and most immigration matters (per s 244). 
32 11992] 3 NZLR 119, 133 . In R v Fitzgerald Unreported, 30 October 1990, High Court, Auckland 
Registry, Tl83/90, at p 4 Thorp J suggested that because of the stringent requirements that the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act placed on police officers it was difficult to imagine a situation 
where a statement would be inadmissible on the grounds of unfairness where the Act had been complied 
with. These cases suggest that by its nature the separate regime for young people is inconsistent with other 
enactments relating to police questioning. See further discussion below n 92 . 
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been overtaken by the more "stringent" requirements in the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act. 
B UN Conventions and the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act 
The two specifically relevant UN documents are the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child33 and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice.
34 
The Beijing Rules were summarised in a basic way in Article 40 of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. Article 40 is entitled "The Administration of Juvenile Justice". The 
separate regime for police questioning of young people in the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act complies with Article 40 by "treat[ing]" a "child alleged as, 
accused of or recognised as having infringed the penal law"35 in a manner which 
"promotes the child's sense of dignity and worth"36 and which "takes into account the 
child's age"37 and the "desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and [assumption 
of] a constructive role in society". Article 40 also sets out the most basic guarantees which 
include (sic)38 
(ii) to be informed of charges (if appropriate through parents and guardians) and to have legal and other 
appropriate assistance in the preparation of his or her defence 
.... (iv) not to be compelled to ... confess guilt. 
The separate regime in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act ensures that 
young people are protected in this manner and have their rights clearly explained to them. 
The Beijing Rules go into more detail. In Part I the rights of juveniles are set out. 
33 Dated 20 November 1989 and ratified by New Zealand on 6 April 1993. 
34 Dated 29 November 1985. The Rules will be referred to as the "Beijing Rules" in this paper. 
35 Note the three stages that the Convention comprehends: "alleged'' , "accused" . and "recognised as 
having [committed]. " The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act has three stages in sections 
215-217: "before questioning", "on deciding to charge", and "on arrest. " The first stage in the Convention 
is further on in an investigation than does the first stage in the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act. 
36 The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act states that a young person must have their rights 
"explained" to them. Further a young person has the choice of which adult will be present. This gives a 
young person a power of choice and control, promoting their dignity and self worth . 
37 Note that this provision is set out in s 25(i) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act follows Art 14( 4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which also sets out this provision. The Children, Young Persons. and Their Families Act conforms with 
this provision. By its nature the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act only applies to a certain 
age group. Section 218 recognises that young people need their rights to be exl)lained to them in a 
language and in a manner that they can understand. Section 10 directs that proceedings in court (be it the 
Family Court or the Youth Court) are to be exl)lained to the young person. 
38 Article 40(2). 
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Basic procedural safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be notified of charges
39 
, 
the right to remain silent40 , the right to counsel
41 
, the right to the presence of a parent or guardian
42
, the 
right to confront and examine witnesses and the right to appeal shall be granted at all stages of the 
proceedings ( emphasis added) 
Part II of the Rules deals with what should occur during the investigation and prosecution 
of an offence. Parents and guardians are to be notified upon the apprehension of a 
juvenile. Section 229 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act complies 
with this requirement. By the use of the words "at all stages of the proceedings" the 
Beijing Rules may be read as suggesting that, like the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act, the rights are to be examined before questioning. However the use of the 
word "proceedings" tends to suggest that the application of the Rules was intended to be 
limited to situations where a young person is actually charged with an offence. 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Beijing Rules were obviously 
influential in the formation of the separate regime for young people, although it is notable 
that New Zealand did not ratify the Convention until April 1993 . 
43 
C Other Jurisdictions 44 
i. Canada 
Section 56 of the Young Offenders Act 1982 sets out a similar procedure to the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act. The rights set out in section 56 are the same as 
the rights given by section 215(c), (e), and (f) .
45 However section 56 differs from the 
Children, Young Persons, And Their Families Act provisions in several ways. 
39 Section 232(l)(a) Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. 
40 Section 215(l)(c) Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act . 
41 Sections 215(1)(1) and 227 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act . 
42 Sections 8 and 215(l)(t) Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act . 
43 Some commentators have suggested that UN documents should be used as a tool for statutory 
interpretation, for example see Graeme Austin "The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
domestic law" (1994) BFLJ 87; A Shaw and A Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act Comes Alive 
(I) [1991] NZLJ 400; also Public Law Jn New Zealand - cases, materials, commentary and questions by 
Mai Chen and Geoffrey Palmer, (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) Ch 19, pp 590-593 . Shaw and 
Butler note that the long title of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states that it is to "affirm New 
Zealand's conunitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and suggest that this 
leads to the Covenant being an interpretative tool. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
does not mention international instruments at all despite some similarity to them. There is not as strong a 
basis for interpreting the Act with the help of international instruments. But note Tavita v Afinister of 
Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 where the Court of Appeal used the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as aids in an immigration matter. It is 
arguable that international docun1ents may be used more readily for interpretation (see Austin, above) . 
44 It is recognised that there are differences in the definition of "child" and/or "young person" in the 
following legislation. Those differences are not discussed in this paper. The sections mentioned in this 
part that directly deal with police questioning of young people are featured in the Appendix to this paper. 
45 The rights to be exl)lained to a young person in Canada are: 
(i) That there is no obligation to make a statement: 
(ii) That any statement that is made can be used in evidence; and 
15 
(i) Section 215 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act applies to 
questioning by and statements made to an "enforcement officer".
46 Section 56 applies to a 
"peace officer or other person who is, in law, a person in authority". This is arguably a 
wider scope. 
(ii) Like section 225 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, section 56 
expressly saves other law applying to questioning and the admissibility of statements. 
However, despite that saving, sections 56(2)(a) and 56(5) somewhat redundantly provide 
that a young person's statement must be voluntary and not the result of duress . 
(iii) Section 56 differs from section 215 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act in that it restricts and directs police questioning rather than setting out 
purposive rights. Section 215 speaks of"entitle[ments]", but section 56 speaks of"being 
given" rights. Section 215 affirms rights that already exist, whereas section 56 actually 
creates those rights and directs that they are to be complied with. In the sense of directing 
compliance section 56 is more like section 221 . 
(iv) Section 56 provides for a consultation with and presence by an adult at the 
questioning. Unlike the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act only one adult is 
contemplated . 47 There is a ranking in section 56( c) of preferable adults, a ranking that is 
not present in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act: 
counsel or a parent, or in the absence of a parent, an adult 
relative, or in the absence of a parent and adult relative, any 
other appropriate adult chosen by the young person. 
The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act gives the choice and the power to 
young people to choose who is to be present and who to consult with. The only limitation 
on that is section 231(2) .
48 
( v) Section 56( 4) provides that a young person can waive their rights. A waiver must be in 
writing and there must be included a statement that the young person has understood the 
nature of the rights that are being waived. There is scope for the view that a young person 
must not only understand the rights that are being waived, but must also understand the 
consequences of waiving those rights. 
49 The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
(iii) That there is a right to consult with and make a statement in the presence of an adult, 
counsel or a parent. 
46 See ss 2 and 214(3), an "enforcement officer' ' includes police, public servants, and officers of local 
authorities. 
47 See s 215(£) of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. The word "and" is used 
specifically contemplating the presence of more than one observer. See R v Fitzgerald above, n 32. 
Section 56 uses the word "or" . 
48 This provision allows an enforcement officer to refuse to accept a young person's nomination of adult 
where he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the chosen adult would (broadly) be likely to pervert 
the course of justice. 
49 See Clarkson v R [ 19861 1 SCR 383 for the Canadian view on the point. See similar authority in New 
Zealand for adults in R v Tawhiti [1993] 3 NZLR 594, per Smellie J at pp 597-598, because Tawhiti did 
not know the true nature of the jeopardy he faced (he had not been told that the man he had assaulted had 
died in hospital) his waiver could not be valid. See also Keni v Police (1992) 9 CRNZ 374 where the court 
held that there was an obligation on the prosecution to establish to the civil standard that a waiver had 
been made with the full knowledge of the rights being foregone. Also see R v Yensen (1961) 36 CR 339, 
below n 107. 
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Act does not allow waiver of the rights provided by the Act. 
50 In Police v BG (a young 
person/ 1 the young person gave the police an incorrect age and consequently had adult 
rights read to him rather than the rights in the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act. It was held that the young person could not waive his rights by giving an 
incorrect age. The subjective belief of a police officer as to the age of the alleged offender 
is irrelevant to the obligations under the section. 
(vi) Section 56 has been held not applicable to purely investigative inquiries by the 
police. 52 The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act is not clear on this point. 
However section 215 of the Act also speaks of "questioning" in relation to the "possible 
commission of an offence" by a young person as distinct from the exclusive use of the 
word "statement" in section 56. A "statement" is the formal recording of an interview 
once a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that the young person has been 
involved in an offence. 53 "Questioning" about the "possible commission" is a more 
tentative sort of inquiry. Certainly the New Zealand police believe that the rights in section 
215 have to be explained even at the investigative stage of an inquiry.
54 
2. Australia55 
(a) Australian Capital Territory 
Section 3 0 of the Children's Services Ordinance 1986 limits the police from interviewing 
or "caus[ing] [a] child to do anything in connection with the investigation of an offence" 
to situations where a parent, relative or appropriate adult is present. The following points 
can be made. 
(i) The Ordinance refers only to a "police officer". It does not contemplate application to a 
"person in authority" as the Canadian section does. 
50 See Police v B [1993] DCR 472 where Judge Twaddle held that a young person could not waive their 
rights under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act because the Legislature had intended 
to give young people effective and concrete rights. 
51 (1993) 10 FRNZ 157. Note there is criticism of this decision: see Trapski 's Fami~y Law (Brooker & 
Friend, Wellington, 1991). vol 1, eh 1.19, p A-254, note (wa) . 
52 R v A (C4) (1989) 101 AR 155 (Prov Ct). 
53 Ibid, 157. 
54 See the police submissions in Report of the A.finisteria/ Review Team of the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act 1989 above. n 26, pp 146-159. The police fought hard for a change that is 
reflected in the Children. Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill. see further discussion 
below at pp 35-38 of this paper. There is a prevailing view that the police were stringently constrained by 
the procedure: see R v Tako (1991) 7 FRNZ 447, 447-448 where Sinclair J held a statement inadmissible 
because Toko was not advised of his rights at all. and had accompanied an officer to the station ·without 
realising that he did not have to. Sinclair J expressed sympathy for the police saying 
Ilow any serving police officer could be expected to remember. .. all the matters required to be remembered under 
section 215 .... places the officer in an impossible sih1ation. 
See also "New Zealand: Review Sought on Search Laws" New Zealand Herald 13 February 1992. pl. 
Note however the comments of the Hon. Dr Michael Cullen in NZPD. No. 5, 727. 24 March 1994 
The Law as it is, does not prevent [the police] from engaging in initial enquiries. 
The issue is unclear. Police practice in this matter means that the Children, Young Persons. and Their 
Families Act was a real change from the former regime: Rule 1 of the Judges ' Rules allowed for 
preliminary questioning. 
55 
Note that other Australian states are different, for instance in South Australia the police are only 
constrained by the common law and their General Instructions. 
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(ii) Like the Canadian statute the Ordinance does not
 affirm rights, it serves to limit the 
powers of the police. 
(iii) There is no ranking of the adults who are permit
ted to be present when a young 
person is questioned by police. It is not clear from the wo
rding whether more than one of 
these adults can be present. It is clear that there is no spec
ific right to consult with that 
adult, although in practice such consultation may tak
e place. 
(iv) While there is no provision entitling a waiver by 
a young person, section 30(3)(e) 
contemplates a situation where none of the adults ref
erred to can be present. Section 30(3) 
allows for the presence of another person. That perso
n may be a police officer 
unconnected with the offence. The New Zealand legi
slation also contemplates a situation 
where the nominated adult will not be available withi
n a reasonable time (sections 
221 (2)( c)(iii)(B) and 231(1 )( d)), but provides in sect
ion 222(2)(b) that another adult who 
is not an enforcement officer can be nominated. The 
New Zealand legislation gives the 
further protection of an independent adult in that situ
ation. 
(v) It is not clear whether the Ordinance applies to restric
t police from making purely 
investigative inquiries to situations where one of the 
specified adults is present. The use of 
the words "cause the child to do anything in connect
ion with the investigation of an 
offence" could be read as requiring adult presence du
ring preliminary inquiries. Seymour
56 
takes the view that the Ordinance applies only to inte
rviews or procedures such as 
identification parades or re-enactments. 
(b) New South Wales 
Section 13(1) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings)
 Act 1987 provides that evidence 
given to the police by a child is not admissible unless
 an adult was present when the 
evidence was given. Several points can be made. 
(i) The NSW statute is specifically linked to a police 
interviewing situation, rather than any 
person in authority. 
(ii) Like the Canadian and ACT provisions, section 1
3(1) limits police rather than setting 
out the rights of young people. 
(iii) The adults mentioned are not prioritised and the 
use of the word "or" suggests that 
only one person can be present. This is not clear. The
re does not appear to be a right to 
consult with that person, but once again it seems that
 practically such consultation must 
occur. It is also notable that the young person does not ha
ve the power to choose which 
adult is present unless he or she is of or above 16 yea
rs, sections 13(1)(a)(i) and (ii) . 
(iv) There is no provision entitling waiver. However 
sections 13 ( 1 )(b )(i) and (ii) 
contemplate the admission of evidence where the cou
rt is satisfied there was a "proper and 
sufficient reason for the absence of the required adult
" and where in the particular 
circumstances the court considers the evidence shoul
d be admitted . The NSW statute 
retains a lot of judicial discretion. Section 224 of the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act provides that reasonable compliance mu
st occur before evidence infringing 
the Act will be admissible. As Thorp J pointed out in F
itzgerald 
51 there is no residual 
discretion to admit statements. Unless there had in fa
ct been substantial compliance the 
statements would be excluded . 
56 Dealing With Yo ung Offenders by John Seymour (19
88) p 195. 
57 Above n 32, 5. 
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(v) Section 13 applies to any " statement, confession,
 admission or information" (emphasis 
added) that is given to police. Seymour
58 sees the word " information" as indicating that 
the NSW statute applies at any stage during an inves
tigation. 
3. U S.A 
In the United States different states have enacted differ
ent statutes to ensure that the rights 
in Miranda
59 are applied to juveniles. 
60 Some states have enacted statutory regimes which 
have additional requirements to the rights set out in M
iranda. Those are requirements 
such as the presence of parents or statutorily approve
d places of questioning.
61 Generally 
throughout the United States the courts have acted a
nd have gone beyond the 
requirements in Miranda to scrupulously examine the 
circumstances surrounding a 
juvenile' s statement to police. Several points can be 
made. 
(i) In order for Miranda to apply, whether statutorily 
supported or through case law, the 
young person must be interrogated in custody.
62 Miranda has been held not to apply to 
shop guards.
63 The regime is limited to formal interrogations, and ap
pears to be limited to 
police officers. 
(ii) Miranda sets out positive rights. Statute law and c
ase law applying Miranda to 
juveniles have a tendency to control police conduct b
ut this is true of case law in New 
Zealand as well . 
(iii) In Pennsylvania the courts have created a rule wh
ich requires the exclusion of a young 
person' s statements if it appears there was no opport
unity for the young person to confer 
with an interested and informed adult prior to the ma
king of the statement. There appears 
to be no prioritising of adults in that rule. 
(iv) Whether a young person is competent to waive t
heir rights is a controversial issue in 
the U.S . In Fare v Michael c6
4 the Supreme Court decided that the appropriate test 
for 
evaluating waivers ofrights is the "totality of all the 
circumstances test". The Court held 
that a young person is not incompetent by age alone 
and that there was no need for a 
parent or supportive adult to be present. Adult waive
rs must be knowing and voluntary, 
and for young people the same requirements must be
 imposed. Depending on the 
circumstances waiver is possible in the United States
. 
(v) Because Miranda only applies to custodial interro
gation the statutes and case law 
relating to young people apply only to the formal inte
rrogation procedure and not to the 
investigative stages of an inquiry. 
58 Above n 55 . 
59 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966). The Miranda
 rights are that there be a warning prior to 
questioning of the right to remain silent, the fact tha
t a statement may be used as evidence, and the right 
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appo
inted. A discretion to exclude on overall fairness 
grounds is retained by the American courts. 
60 Rights of Juveniles - The Juvenile Justice System by 
Samuel M Davis (198 I) eh 3, pp 44-47. Note that 
the courts have also acted to ensure that young peopl
e receive their constitutional rights such as the right 
to counsel, the right to silence, due process rights etc
: see the Supreme Court in Re Gault 387 US I 
(1967). 
61 See New York State, Jn Re Emilio Al 44 App.Div 2d 
791(1974) where a statement was held 
inadmissible because it had not been taken in an app
roved place. 
62 Representing the Child Client by MI Soler et al (199
0) , eh 5, p 32. 
63 JnRe Deborah C 635P2d446(Cal 1981). 
64 442 us 707 (I 979) 
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D Case Law 
J. Introduction 
In New Zealand the ltwin65 decision caused a great deal of public debate about the 
separate regime for young people. !twin was a blatant case of non-compliance by the 
police; Irwin was simply not advised of any of his rights. Fisher J held that the 
non-compliance had been inexcusable given the earlier decided cases and the police form 
"Youth Checklist - steps for investigation" that was in common usage. That form includes 
a checklist of the rights to be explained to young people. Fisher J held that it was his duty 
to give effect to the scheme sanctioned by Parliament. Irwin's statement was excluded and 
he was subsequently acquitted of a charge of murder. 
66 
Case law in New Zealand has focused on two main issues: whether there had been 
reasonable compliance with the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
procedure and whether the procedure in the Act applied to an offender who allegedly 
committed an offence when a young person but who is no longer a young person. 
In this section I will look at New Zealand case law on these issues. Case law from Canada 
and Australia on similar issues will also be considered. 
2. New Zealand 
Before any statement can be admissible evidence in New Zealand, the prosecution must 
show that there has been at least reasonable compliance with the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act procedures in the questioning of the young person. The 
Court of Appeal has indicated that reasonable compliance will be viewed strictly. The 
protections in the separate Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act regime apply 
only to alleged offenders who are young people when proceedings are contemplated, not 
when the crime is allegedly committed. 
In Fitzgerald'7 Thorp J made a very detailed analysis of the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act procedure. Fitzgerald was arrested after the courtroom machete attack 
65 
R v Irwin above, n 32. 
66 See R v Irwin Unreported 3 December 1991 , High Court, Hamilton Registry , T32/91 (iudgment the 
day after the judgment excluding Irwin ' s statement, above n 32). Irwin was charged with the murder of 
Steven Slavich. His co-accused Rogers pleaded guilty. The police case against Irwin centred on whether 
he knew that murder was a probable consequence of their common purpose to carry out an aggravated 
robbery using a firearm . Although he was not arrested, Irwin was taken to the Paeroa police station. He 
was not advised of his rights . There was a lot of misinformation in the media about the lrwi n decision, at 
best he could have been charged as a party to murder and the police had a dubious case on that ground. 
The case continues to cl'eate attention, see "Police Welcome Interview Powers" New Zealand Herald, 1 
June 1992, p 1 and also "Criminal Children 's Act" Letter to the Editor (with subsequent replies) 
Dominion, 15 July 1994. 
67 
See above, n 3 2. 
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on a Youth Court Judge. Confusion occurred because Fitzgerald's lawyer was a witness 
and was unable to act for him. Fitzgerald's right to another lawyer was not clearly 
explained and he was not told that he also had the right to the presence of another adult. 
Thorp J excluded the statement that Fitzgerald made concluding
68 
[the Act] looks to the substance rather than the form of the interrogation procedure. 
The onus is on the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there had been 
reasonable compliance with Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act procedure. 
His Honour pointed out that he had no residual discretion to admit statements; unless 
there had been in fact reasonable compliance the statements would be excluded.
69 Thorp J 
saw " reasonable compliance" as being "substantial compliance" with Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act procedure. It was not sufficient to comply after the 
statement had been made. 
70 
In R v Crime Appeal (CA311 91/
1 the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of whether 
there had been substantial compliance with Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act procedure. The Court supported Thorp J' s view that the substance of the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act had to be complied with. A statement was 
admitted where it was taken at home, in the presence of the young person's mother and 
where the young person was told that he could be arrested, that he was entitled to legal 
advice, that he did not have to make a statement and that he could withdraw his consent at 
any time. He was given a period to consult with his mother in private. He was not told that 
he could nominate an adult to consult with and to be present. The Court of Appeal held 
that the spirit of the legislation had been complied with but that it was a borderline case, 
adding72 
We are far from suggesting that these sections impose mere formalities and 
may be disregarded with impunity by investigating police 
officers. That is certainly not the case. 
The Court took a very strict view and held that for reasonable compliance to occur the 
spirit of each of the requirements must be reasonably complied with. 
In Police v Edge 13 the Court of Appeal upheld a ruling that Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act procedure only applied to offenders who were young people at the time 
proceedings were contemplated, not those who were young people when they committed 
68 Ibid, 4. 
69 Ibid, 5. 
70 Ib' 1d, R v Fitzgerald at p 11 : 
I doubt whether there will be many cases when ex post facto compliance will be held reasonable compliance ""ith the 
requirements of the Act. It is very difficult to go back to the starting point once an interrogation has continued to a 
stage where a confession ... has been obtained ... 
"I (1991) 7 CRNZ 539; (1991) 8 FRNZ 119. 
"~ Ibid, 544 . 
73 
(1992) 9 FRNZ 659; [1993] 2 NZLR 7. 
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an offence. The Court of Appeal said the whole scheme of the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act was74 
to make provision for the perceived special needs and circumstances 
of children and young persons. 
Where an offender was no longer a young person there was no need for that provision to 
be made. 
3. Canada 
The prosecution has the onus of proving that there was compliance with the procedures 
set out in section 56 of the Young Offenders Act 1982. In Canada the issue is not whether 
there had been reasonable compliance, but rather whether there had been a valid waiver. 
The prosecution must satisfy the court that the waiver was valid. In Canada there is a case 
which suggests a similar approach to that taken in Edge 
75 on the question of whether an 
adult offender is protected by section 56 where the offence in question was allegedly 
committed while a young person. 
In Clarkson v R76 Wilson J held that a waiver must involve a true appreciation of the 
rights that are being given up . In Wilson J's view it was not enough for an accused to 
merely comprehend the rights that are being waived; the accused must appreciate the 
consequences of giving up those rights . It is up to the Crown to prove that the waiver is 
valid. Using Wilson J's test that would be an onerous task because it would be extremely 
difficult to prove actual comprehension. 
77 
Section 5 of the Young Offenders Act 1982 extends the sentencing powers of the Youth 
Court to adult offenders who committed the offences when they were young people. In R 
v Z (DA) 78 the Supreme Court held that section 5 did not determine whether the whole 
Act applied to such persons. The Court held that the special purpose of section 56 was the 
deciding factor . The Supreme Court took a similar approach to the Court of Appeal in 
Edge79 holding that the statement was admissible. The older the defendant was the less 
persuasive was the claim to the special protections given by the Legislature to protect the 
74 Ibid, 661 . 
75 
See above, n 73 . 
76 S ee above, n 49. 
77 It is by no means clear that Wilson J's test has been universally accepted. In R v Manni en ll 987] 1 
SCR 1233 the Canadian Supreme Court spoke of the need for an "actual waiver" but did not clearly define 
the term. In R v Thibodeau (1989) 101 NBR (2d) 208 statements were excluded on the grounds of 
unfairness . One of the features of unfairness was the fact that the prosecution had not shown that the 
accused was aware of the consequences of making the statements. The accused in Thibodeau was not 
aware of the consequences of giving up his right to silence. Note also the New Zealand case law on 
requiring subjective understanding, see R v Mallinson (1992) 8 CRNZ 409 (High Court first instance), 
(1992) 8 CRNZ 707 (Court of Appeal) and Mallinson (No 2) (1992) 9 CRNZ 691 ; see above n 49 and 
below at n 106 and n 107. 
08 
[1992]2SCR1025. 
79 
See above, n 73 . 
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immature. However in other cases the Canadian courts have extended section 56 
protections to adults who allegedly committed the offence while young people. 
80 The 
Supreme Court's judgment is of higher precedent value and is the later judgment; 
therefore that judgment may have decided the issue . 
./. Australia81 
In Australia it is accepted that the prosecution have the onus of satisfying the court that 
the evidence in question should be admitted. That includes the onus of proving that a 
particular statutory scheme has been complied with. Rather than there being a situation 
where reasonable compliance is required, the Australian courts retain a great deal of 
discretion to admit evidence despite deficiencies . 82 It is not clear what the general 
approach is to the question of whether a separate regime for young people would cover 
adults who allegedly committed offences while young people. There is New South Wales 
case law which suggests that those individuals will be protected by the separate regime for 
young people. 
Like the New Zealand courts' approach to reasonable compliance the Australian courts 
have rarely exercised the discretion to admit young people's evidence that does not 
comply with a statutory scheme. In T v Waye 83 a 14 year old was separated from his elder 
brother and questioned without the presence of an independent adult. The court held that 
the defendant's subsequent confession was inadmissible because
84 
a basic requirement in the questioning of juveniles has not been complied with. 
In R v M 5 the Queensland Criminal Court held that the police officer in question ought to 
have told the 12 year old defendant that he did not have to accompany her to the station 
for questioning. The Court in M refused to exercise the discretion to admit the 
defendant's statement, instead holding it to be involuntary. 
In Bullock v Kennedy86 the court applied the statutory scheme
87 and held that an accused 
who was deemed a young person for the purposes of that Act was entitled to the 
protections for young people set out in section 81 C. That section set out the protections 
that are now in section 13 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987. Section 
13(2)(b) deems a person who is alleged to have committed an offence while a child to be 
80 For example see R v F (K) (1990) 86 Ntld & PEIR 238 and R v P (J) (1989) 73 CR 205 . 
81 Australian case law will be considered in general terms. The approach of specific states will not be 
separately considered. 
82 See for examples 40(1) Children ' s Services Ordinance 1986 (ACT) and s 13(l)(b) Children (Criminal 
Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW). 
83 (1983) 35 SASR 247. 
84 Ibid, 251 . This is a South Australian case. There is no separate statutory regime to deal \\ith police 
questioning of young people. Police General Instructions and the common law apply. The confession was 
held inadmissible on the grounds of unfairness. 
85 [1976] Qd R 344. 
86 
(1988) 12 NSWLR 200. 
87 
In that case it was the Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW) . 
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within the definition of "criminal proceedings" and therefore covered by the special regime 
in that section. However it is not clear that this is a general trend. 
E Conclusions 
From the analysis of other jurisdictions it is clear that the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act and case law resulting from it takes a more protective stance than other 
jurisdictions. In New Zealand there is no residual discretion for the courts to admit a non-
complying statement. The courts have taken a strict view of the requirement for 
"reasonable compliance". There is no entitlement for a young person to waive his or her 
rights. Finally, even if the young person's choice of adult is not available, the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act declares that an enforcement officer cannot be 
substituted for that independent adult . New Zealand and Canada seem to be united in one 
area; an adult offender who committed an offence while a young person is not entitled to 
the protection of a separate regime. The general Australian approach to that question is 
unclear. 
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IV THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
A Introduction 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was enacted after a lengthy process. The Act 
was initially to be entrenched legislation,88 it was even considered as higher law, a kind of 
constitutional basis for New Zealand's other legislation. When it was enacted it was a 
basic statute. It was not greeted with enthusiasm. 
There was a prevailing view that the new New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was a weak and 
useless piece oflegislation; a "dead letter".8
9 However as soon as the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal had the opportunity to interpret the Act it began to be taken more seriously. 
In a series of cases the New Zealand courts have taken the dead letter and made it 
dynamic and extremely influential especially in the area of civil rights. 
This part will examine a number of New Zealand cases
90 and trends suggested in Canadian 
case law. These cases indicate a broadening of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to 
include different applications of rights for different circumstances. With possible reform in 
the common law relating to police questioning and the admissibility of confessions 
signaJled by the Law Commission,91 this part will analyse whether those changes and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protect young people in the same way as they are 
protected now. 
This part will also examine the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment 
Bill . In my view the Amendment Bill closes the gap between the adult regime and the 
separate regime for young people. 
88 A constitutional or entrenched Bill of Rights imposes limits on legislative power and allows courts to 
declare legislation null and void. A statutory Bill of Rights controls executive and judicial power but not 
legislative power: see A dams on Criminal Law, (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992) Vo! 2. eh 10. 
89 "The Pragmatic Application of Fundamental Principles: Keeping a Rogues ' Charter Respectable" by 
David M Paciocco. p I , " [ the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was] declared by most to have been still-
born. a lifeless carcass. " See also Public Law in New Zealand - cases, materials, commentary and 
questions by Mai Chen and Geoffrey Palmer, above n 43 , eh 18, pp 463-564 . 
90 It is recognised that there are a great number of issues surrounding the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
These issues are all interesting and controversial but cannot all be covered in this paper. Canadian case 
law will be considered because of the similarity between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
91 
See, above n 3. 
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B The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and Rights when Questioned 
Section 225 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act specifically states that 
other enactments relating to the admissibility of statements and confessions are unaffected 
by the separate regime. Therefore the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act already has 
application to young people .92 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act sets out rights relating to searches, arrests and 
detentions in sections 21 to 27 . Sections 23 , 24 and 25 are the relevant sections for police 
questioning. Section 23 sets out the rights of people who are arrested and detained. 
Included in those rights is the right to be informed of the reason for the detention (section 
23(l)(a)), the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and the right to be 
informed of the right ( section 23 (1 )(b)) and the right to refrain from making a statement 
(section 23( 4)) . Section 24 sets out the rights of people who are charged with an offence. 
Section 25 sets out the minimum standards of criminal procedure. Included in section 25 
are the following: 
(d) The right not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt 
... 
(i) the right, in the case of a child, to be dealt with in a manner that takes account of the child's93 age 
Note that the sections refer to people who are detained, arrested or charged with an 
offence. It is limited in scope to enforcement officers who have the power to detain, 
arrest, or charge. 
C Case Law 
1. A pwposive intetpretation 
In interpreting and applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the courts must strive to avoid becoming 
verbose and evolving fine distinctions. A Bill of Rights should be interpreted generously and simply, no 
matter whether or not it was entrenched94 
92 Brooker 's Summary Proceedings (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1994) eh 4, p 55 . See also R v 
Irwin above n 32 p 129 where Fisher J expressed the opinion that the rights provided by the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act has been overtaken by the more "stringent' ' requirements in the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act. Note however, above n 73 , that in Police v Edge and Irwin the court 
indicated that the statements would have been excluded even if the Children. Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act was not operable, because there were breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
93 
Note that "child" is not defined in the Act. There may be an issue as to whether the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act is therefore limited by the defined ages (child = under 14 years: young person = between 14 
and 17, but under 17 years, per s 2) set out in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. Note 
that "child" is defined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a person under 18 years unless 
national laws recognise the age of majority earlier. This proviso is perhaps not surprising given the 
diversity of cultural views as to when a person is a child. Also see above n 44. 
94 
R v Te Kira fl993] 3 NZLR 257, 261 per Cooke P. 
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The New Zealand courts have signalled in a series of cases that a "purposive" or 
"generous" interpretation is to be taken of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
95 A 
purposive interpretation is a changing and evolving interpretation which takes account of 
particular circumstances to ensure that individuals are given the full measure of their 
, h 96 ng ts. 
In R v Kereopa97 the defendant was held by a store detective who suspected him of 
stealing a soft toy. A police officer was present for some of the time but the defendant was 
not formally arrested. During this detention the defendant was not told of his right to a 
lawyer. The District Court took a purposive interpretation of the defendant's right to a 
lawyer. The Court held that the most important function of that right was to enable the 
defendant to obtain advice and to ensure that he understood his rights, particularly the 
right to silence. For this particular defendant it was unfair to deprive him of his rights by 
failing to formally arrest him. A reasonable opportunity of access to counsel was not 
given. 
The purposive approach taken by the courts first looks at the purpose, function or 
underlying value of a right and then looks at the particular circumstances, including the 
particular defendant. The purposive approach takes the meaning best suited to promote 
the right. 
2. "Arrest" extended 
When comparing it to the separate regime in the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act one of the obvious limiting factors in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is 
the fact that the rights in sections 23 to 25 apply only to those who are "arrested or 
detained under any enactment". The separate regime applies before questioning, before 
arrest is considered . The use of the words "detained under any enactment" prevent New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act protections extending to detentions for the purpose of 
questioning, since there is no enactment which authorises detention for the purpose of 
questioning. To remedy this problem the Court of Appeal, using a purposive approach to 
the rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, extended the concept of "arrest" beyond 
its formal meaning. In R v Butcher and Burgess
98 the concept of "arrest" was extended to 
include de facto detention or a situation where the accused believes that there is an 
inability to leave and where that belief has been induced by police conduct. In Goodwin
99 
the majority of the Court of Appeal drew back from Butcher and held that there must be a 
manifestation of an intention to arrest by words or conduct. 
95 See also Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439; R v Butcher and Burgess 
[1991] 2 NZLR 257; andR v Tawhiti [1993] 3 NZLR 59-l, 597 
What matters .... is whether Mr Tawh.iti was accorded the substance of his rights, and an overly analytical or 
compartmentalised approach .... might obscure that question 
Sec also R v Big M Drug Mart (1985] I SCR 295,344. 
96 
A dams on Criminal Law above n 88. Vol 2. eh 10. p 68. 
97 (1991) 7 CRNZ 204. 
98 See above, n 9 5. 
99 R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 . Note that in Goodwin the Court of Appeal held that although not 
"arrested" the accused was arbitrarily detained in breach of s 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
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Note however that in R v Edwards
100 the Court of Appeal said101 
[I]t is important not to lose sight of the fact that the police have a duty to investigate and prosecute crime. 
The fact that they are interviewing a suspect at a police station does not mean that he or she must 
inevitably be regarded as detained. 
That approach was echoed by Thomas J in R v Wadde/102 
Provided, therefore, that the rights of the person being interviewed are protected and the interview is 
conducted fairly, it is unnecessary and undesirable to bring forward the point of time when a person can 
properly be said to be under arrest. 
This latter approach does not bode well for young people or in fact any person who is 
interviewed by the police. It could be said that this approach creates a right for the police 
to detain for questioning and not explain New Zealand Bill of Rights Act rights. It is an 
approach that has been criticised for restricting the right to counsel and the right of silence 
where no restrictions were imposed in the Act.
103 Under the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act young people have their rights explained to them before 
questioning. 
This question has not been resolved, but it is clear that the courts have been endeavouring 
by taking a purposive approach to ensure that civil rights are granted to those who are 
questioned by the police. It is the purposive application of that approach that has divided 
the courts. 
3. Rights case law and subjective circumstances 
(a) Understanding rights 
A great deal of case law on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act has centred on whether an 
accused has waived the rights guaranteed under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. It has 
been accepted that before a waiver is valid an accused must understand the rights that are 
being given up. It has also been held that a mere incantation of rights will not necessarily 
be sufficient to comply with the Act. An accused must be "informed" of his or her rights. 
In R v Adams104 the court held that the adequacy of a warning under the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act depended upon the clarity and accuracy of it and the surrounding 
circumstances. An incantation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act rights did not satisfy 
the Act. In R v Cullen105 the Court of Appeal held that the police must be sure that the 
suspect understood the rights. However if it was reasonable on the facts to infer that the 
suspect did understand the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act rights then that was sufficient. 
There must be a reason for the officer to think that the suspect did not understand. 
100 
(1991) 7 CRNZ 528. 
101 
Ibid, 535. 
102 
Unreported, 25 November 1991 , High Court, Auckland Registry, Tl 19/91 , p 4. 
103 S p . ee ac1occo, above n 89, pp 29-32 . 
104 
(1993) 10 CRNZ 687. 
105 
(1992) 8 CRNZ 353 . 
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In R v Mallinson 106 the Court of Appeal held that the content of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act rights must be brought home to the accused. The court said that this was not 
the same question as whether the police were justified in assuming that an accused did 
understand them. Where an accused is advised of his or her rights there will be an 
inference of understanding. The Court of Appeal indicated that this was not the same 
approach as Cullen . It is not a question of whether an accused had some sort of disability 
that was obvious to the police officer which would require modification of the rights 
explanation. Normally an accused ' s statement that he or she did understand the rights 
explanation would be sufficient. However if an accused raises an evidential question about 
his or her understanding, it is a subjective test. The prosecution must prove subjective 
understanding of the rights by the accused. At the retrial in R v Mallinson (No. 2)1°
1 
McGechan J held that the purposes of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act were best to be 
served by a subjective approach as to whether a person has actually understood and been 
adequately informed of his or her rights. McGechan J viewed this approach as furthering 
the purposive interpretation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act - ensuring that the best 
protection is given to a suspect. 
In Ryan v Ministry of Transport108 the court held that due to the appellant ' s intoxication, 
state of upset and age (17 years) he had not been made aware of his New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act rights. His appeal was allowed on thjs ground. 
The consequences of waiving rights must also be understood by an accused. 
109 
In Canada there is case law that suggests that " informing" an accused of his or her rights 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms may require the use of different 
language110 for different suspects. The accused must at the least have the opportunity to 
become aware of his or her legal rights. In McA vena v R111 the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal held that the duty to inform had five attributes, one of which was to inform in a 
language which the accused could understand and appreciate . The Court held that these 
106 (1992) 8 CRNZ 707 (CA) . On point see Andrew S Butler "An Objective or Subjective Approach to the 
Right to be Informed of the Right to Counsel? A New Zealand Perspective" 36 Criminal Law Quarterly 
(Canada) 317. For commentary relating to the application of this case to the term "without delay" in 
s 23(l)(b) see "Basic Requirements of section 23(J)(b) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990" by Bede Harris, 
Case and Conunent [ 1993 J NZLJ 86. Also note that the Court of Appeal judgment has also been read in 
reference to the duty to facilitate access to a lawyer : see Ryder v Police Unreported, 25 July 1994, High 
Court, Timaru Registry APPS17/94. 
101 
(1992) 9 CRNZ 691. See also R v Yensen above n 77 where a Canadian court held that it is not 
sufficient to ask a child if she or he understood a caution. The police officer must demonstrate that the 
child understood the caution and the consequences that would flow from making a statement. 
108 
(1993) 10CRNZ318. 
109 
See, above n 77. 
110 
See R v Shields ( 1983) 10 WCB 120 (Ont Co Ct), 122 per Borins J 
.. should be explained, in an easily understood language .. 
111 
(1987) 56 CR (3d) 303 (Sask.CA) . 
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attributes were in conformity with the purposive interpretation to be taken of 
. . 1 . h 112 const1tut1ona ng ts. 
Therefore, on the basis of this case law it is submitted that when assessing whether an 
accused has been informed of his or her rights the features of that accused, the 
surrounding circumstances and the language used to explain the rights will be considered 
by the court . The inference that once informed an accused understands his or her rights 
may be rebutted by the accused's young age. 
113 The Canadian requirement that language 
be used that an accused will understand, would protect young people by ensuring that the 
requirement now present in section 218
114 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act is still satisfied. 
(b) A particular right and a possible extension 
- the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay 
The right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and the right to be informed of 
that right is set out in section 23(l)(b) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Section 215 
of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act has a broader right than this; there 
is a right to a lawyer and/or a parent and/or a nominated adult. However the section 
23(l)(b) right may have been extended to include a right to consult a parent or another 
adult. 
A great deal of the case law about section 23 ( 1 )(b) has focused upon matters such as the 
right to privacy when consulting or instructing a lawyer
115 or the meaning of the term 
"without delay. " 116 This paper will not focus on those issues. Instead note will be taken of 
two particular cases which suggest that an accused's right under section 23 ( 1 )(b) can be 
thwarted where the police do not allow contact with an adult of choice. 
In Knapton v Police 117 the High Court held that the right to obtain legal advice varied in 
the way it was exercised in each case. In Knapton the police refusal to allow the defendant 
to telephone his wife had thwarted his right under section 23(1)( b). The specific features 
of the defendant were considered by the Court; he was an Australian citizen, he had no 
112 Ibid, 309. The other four attributes of the duty to inform are ( 1) informing in a language which 
accurately describes the right; (2) at a time when the accused is capable of understanding and appreciating 
the right;(3) before the accused yields up any incriminating evidence; and (4) in sufficient time for the 
accused to use the rights (especially the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay) . 
113 Following the reasoning in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health A uthority [1986] AC 112 
it could be said that the assumption of understanding lessens the younger an accused is. Such a rule does 
not take into account the subjective capabilities of each individual accused, but it would operate in a 
similar way as the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act does now. 
114 
Section 218 requires that a young person be informed in a manner and language that is appropriate to 
his or her age and understanding. Section 25(i) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act requires that a 
child be dealt with in a manner that takes account of the child's age. A requirement for age-based 
language to be used may be implicit in any case. 
115 
See for instance Police v Kohler (1993) 10 CRNZ 118 (CA) and Scott v Police (1993) 11 CRNZ 156. 
116 
See for instance R v Grant (1992) 8 CRNZ 483 (CA) and R v Tunui (1992) 8 CRNZ 294 . 
117 
(1993) 10 CRNZ 515 . 
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contacts in New Zealand and he believed that his wife would know who to call to get him 
legal advice. 
The approach in Knapton was recently followed by the District Court in Dunedin in Police 
v Ellis.118 The defendant was stopped and took a roadside breath test. The officer 
informed the defendant of his right to a lawyer and gave him a list of solicitors who were 
available to call . The defendant requested to be able to call his father in Wellington. That 
request was refused. Judge Everitt held that the police had thwarted the defendant's right 
to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay. The defendant did not indicate that the call 
to his father would be to gain access to a lawyer. Judge Everitt held that that should have 
been the implication to the officer because of several features about the defendant. Given 
his age (23), the fact he was a student living away from home, and his desire to avoid 
publicity, 119 his request to telephone his father for support was not umeasonable. Judge 
Everitt did not accept the view that because the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act only says 
"lawyer" an accused is only able to contact a lawyer. 
120 
[I]n my view it was overly restrictive to interpret the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act as to excluding 
anyone other than a lawyer. Had circumstances been different I might have been willing to put a different 
interpretation on the facts . 
The Ellis case has been stated to the High Court for an appeal. The case indicates that the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act may be extended to include the right to consult a parent or 
another adult. However that right appears limited to situations where that adult can 
facilitate access to a lawyer. The extension has not gone as far as does the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act; there is no general right to consult the adult of 
choice. The approach taken by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is not common in 
overseas jurisdictions. 
121 
Ellis and Knap ton are interesting because of the focus on the specific features of each 
defendant. For relevance to the rights of young people note that the Court in Ellis saw age 
as a relevant factor for assessing whether the defendant should have the right to consult 
the adult of his choice. 
The police must look not only at the specific features of an accused but also must take 
"proper and full account" of the condition of an accused
122 when assessing to what extent 
the section 23(1 )(b) rights should be explained. 
123 
118 
Unreported 31 May 1994, District Court. Dunedin, CRN4012007242. 
119 
The defendant was a well-known sportsperson; a local representative and All Black rugby player. 
120 
See above, n 118, pp 5 and 6. 
121 
See for instance the right to consult a friend, relative, or other person interested in the defendant's 
welfare in s 56 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) and s 23G(l )(a) of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Australia) . Note that the Law Commission, above n 3, p 168, thinks that such a right should be 
available for "vulnerable persons". 
122 
Cotteri/1 v Police Unreported 2 December 1992, High Court, Wellington Registry, AP287/92 . 
123 
See the related commentary above at pp 27-29 of this paper. This duty applies generally to all the 
rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, not just s 23( 1 )(b) . It is a duty to ensure that there is 
understanding as far as is possible. 
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For example, it may not be compliance with the Act for a person to be told perfunctorily of the stipulated 
right of consultation and instruction at a time of great stress in the course of an arrest; or where a person 
of a passive nature and limited intelligence is understandably overawed by circumstances into not 
declaring a desire to exercise the right of consultation.
124 
It is submitted that the police have a two-fold duty under the court-extended section 
23(1)(b). 
First they must take account of the particular features of a suspect: his or her general 
circumstances; for instance whether he or she is living at home, whether he or she has 
contacts living in the area and the age of the suspect. Those features form part of the 
consideration of whether the defendant should be allowed to contact a person other than a 
lawyer. 
Secondly, the police must take account of the condition of a suspect; for instance whether 
he or she is intoxicated, in an excited state, or particularly vulnerable. Those features are 
used to assess whether the right in section 23 (1 )(b) has been understood by the suspect. 
There may be a need to repeat that right
125 or reword it. 126 
In the absence of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act these 
developments would mean that for young people there could be access to adults other 
than a lawyer and that the section 23(l)(b) rights would be "explained"
127 rather than 
being "informed" of those rights . 
D Proposed Changes to the Common Law 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act operates in conjunction with the common law rules 
about the admissibility of confessions and admissions.
128 A breach of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act, or involuntariness or unfairness can all be grounds for exclusion in the 
court's discretion. The Law Commission in its paper Criminal Evidence: Police 
Questioning129 suggested that changes be made to the common law. The Law 
Commission proposed to abolish the common law rule ofvoluntariness and the limitation 
on that rule in section 20 of the Evidence Act 1908 . 
130 The Law Commission stressed that 
124 
R v Tunui above n 116, 297. 
125 
R v Tawhiti , see above n 94. In that case the defendant was handcuffed and held down after a scuffle 
resulting from an early morning drug raid. He was in an excitable state and did not listen to the officer 
who read him his rights. 
126 
R v Narayan (1992) 8 CRNZ 235 . In that case the defendant was unable to understand English and 
had an interpreter. To aid understanding during translation the rights could have been worded differently. 
127 
To use Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act terminology rather than "informed" which is 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act terminology. Ex'Plaining rights suggests a degree of power in the hands of 
}~e recipient, while being informed suggests a passive listener. 
_s See above, p 4 of this paper. These common law rules are those about voluntariness and fairness . 
129 
See above, n 3. 
130 
See above, n 5. In the Law Commission's view those rules had not been operating effectively; ibid, at p 
102. For instance the voluntariness rule does not operate to ensure that a statement is the result of an 
32 
its aim was to make the protection of suspects more effective by simplifying and clarifying 
I I 131 the common aw ru es. 
The Law Commission proposed that three new rules operate in conjunction to cover all 
statements132 that result from police questioning. The prosecution must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that a statement was not influenced by oppressive conduct and that the 
circumstances surrounding the confession would not affect its reliability.
133 Finally there is 
the Improperly Obtained Evidence rule. That rule presumes all evidence inadmissible 
unless a court is satisfied that exclusion would be contrary to the interests of justice. The 
Law Commission suggested a series of factors ought to be considered by the court in its 
discretion under that rule: the nature and gravity of the police impropriety, any bad faith 
on the part of the police, whether the evidence existed and would have been obtained 
regardless, and the importance of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. In the Law 
Commission's view a suspect's subjective features would be considered under all of the 
rules. The Law Commission said that there was a further aim
134 
[A) secondary concern of the rule [change] is that the police interviews of suspects are conducted in a way 
that minimises the risk of unreliability as far as reasonably practicable 
In conjunction with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act the proposed changes to the 
common law could work to protect suspects more thoroughly. The clarity of the Rules 
and the fact that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required means that even a possibility 
of circumstances surrounding the interview affecting the reliability of a statement would 
make the statement inadmissible. For young people, this could mean that age would be a 
decisive factor when looking at those circumstances. The Law Commission's proposal 
was supported by the Law Society
135 and its relevance to young people has also been 
noted. 136 
E Conclusions 
By taking a generous approach to the interpretation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
the courts have allowed its scope to be extended. The subjective features of a defendant 
are relevant in several ways. A defendant's belief that he or she is detained, if induced by 
informed choice to make a statement; there is usually a great deal of psychological pressure imposed upon 
a suspect. Further, even if a statement is voluntary it may still be unreliable due, for example, to a 
suspect's mental illness. 
131 Ibid, p 100. 
132 
Note that the Law Commission proposes that the new rules cover all statements, not just admissions or 
confessions. This is to preclude problems of the definition of a statement. 
133 
The "oppression rule" and the " reliability rule". 
134 S ee, above n 3, p 104. 
135 
See "Police questioning regime should not proceed: Society" Lawtalk 386, 8 February 1993, 1. The 
Law Society was not supportive of another proposal in the Law Conunission 's report; the possibility of 
holding a suspect for the purposes of questioning. 
136 
See Report of the Jvfinisterial Review Team of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
1989 above, n 26, 158. 
[W]e anticipate that the Commission 's findings may have a significant impact on the ultimate fate of section 215. 
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police conduct, activates his or her rights under the Act. A defendant must understand 
those rights and the defendant's capabilities are considered when explaining those rights. 
The defendant's personal circumstances would dictate how those rights could be 
exercised. 
The proposed changes to the common law would mean that the confusion surrounding 
what weight is to be given to the Judges ' Rules and section 20 of the Evidence Act 1908 
would be alleviated. In all three of the proposed Rules a court would take into account the 
features of a particular defendant. 
This emphasis on subjective features could bode well for young people, if, as the Review 
Team on the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act believed, the ultimate fate 
of section 215 will be affected by the changes in the adult regime. It would mean that age 
and vulnerability would be relevant considerations when assessing if evidence from an 
interview would be admissible. 
However, while the focus on subjective features could bode well for young people, the 
new Rules leave a great deal to court discretion. The Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act does not allow the court discretion, there must be reasonable compliance 
with the Act's requirements or the evidence resulting from an interview will not be 
admissible. Before the enactment of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
the court exercised its discretion and differences of approach were common. 
137 
137 
See commentary above at pp 7-10 of the paper. 
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V THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NEW ZEALAND BILL 
OF RIGHTS ACT AND THE CHILDREN, YOUNG PERSONS, AND 
THEIR FAMILIES ACT 
A Introduction 
There are three important areas of difference between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. In each case the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act is more protective than is the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act. 
The first difference is that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act applies only to people who 
are arrested or detained under any enactment, 
138 while the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act applies before questioning. 
Secondly, a suspect is able to waive his or her rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act. There is no ability to do so under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act. 139 
Thirdly, the result of a failure to comply with each Act ' s requirements is different. In the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act section 221 states that evidence obtained 
in breach of the requirements under the Act will be inadmissible unless there has been at 
least reasonable compliance with those requirements . In contrast, the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act does not have a remedies section and it has been left to the courts to resolve 
this omission. 
B Three Points of Difference 
1. "Before questioning" vs. "Arrested or detained under any enactment " 
(a) Differences 
The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act applies at first instance before 
questioning (section 215), while the first time that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
could apply is where a suspect is arrested or detained under any enactment. 
The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act clearly applies at an earlier stage. 
140 
The Police Association saw the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
provisions as "an invitation to non-cooperation.(sic)" 
141 The police submissions to the 
138 See above, n 98 and the conunentary at pp 26-27 of this paper. 
139 See above, n 50. 
140 See above, n 54 . The question of when the Act first applies is contentious. 
141 Report of the Afinisteria/ Review Team of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
above, n 26, 155 . 
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Review Team reflected a view that the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
operated at too early a stage, allowing the "streetwise" to hinder police enquiries. The 
police view was that general enquiries should be undertaken before the necessity for the 
rights to be explained. 
Despite the developments in extending the term "arrest" beyond its formal meaning, the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act still requires conduct on the part of the police which 
induces a suspect's subjective belief that he or she is not free to leave.
142 
(b) The proposed change in the Amendment Bill 
(i) Clause 31 - "reasonable grounds to suspect " 
The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill resulted from the 
Review of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act and the subsequent report 
of the Review Team.
143 The Review Team recommended that section 215 be amended to 
clearly reflect that the police could undertake general enquiries before the rights in section 
215 had to be explained to a young person. Clauses 31 and 31 A in the Amendment Bill 
deal with the issue of police questioning of young people. Parliament did not follow the 
Review Team's recommendation, although the Government had previously agreed in 
principle to that recommendation. 
144 
Clause 31 operates to limit the scope of the term " in relation to the commission or 
possible commission of an offence by that child or young person" in section 215 . The 
Review Team' s recommendation was to limit the term "before questioning". Under clause 
31 the obligation to explain the rights in section 215 arises only where the enforcement 
officer has reasonable grounds to suspect the young person of having committed an 
offence, or where the questioning is intended to obtain an admission. Rather than being 
related to the possible commission of an offence a young person' s rights would only be 
explained to him or her where the enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the young person did commit an offence. The courts are well-used to interpreting 
concepts such as "reasonable grounds to suspect". In section 58A(l)(c) of the Transport 
Act 1962145 an enforcement officer can require a person to undergo a breath test if that 
officer has "good cause to suspect" that the person has committed an offence against Part 
V of that Act. For drug related investigations where a detention warrant or an interception 
warrant is required, or where a search is made
146 there must be " reasonable cause to 
believe" that the warrant is necessary or that the individual is in possession of a controlled 
drug. Where there has been improper communication with a juror the court will use its 
discretion to declare a miscarriage of justice only where there is a " reasonable suspicion" 
that the action influenced the jury' s verdict causing real damage. 
147 
142 See above, n 95 . 
143 See above, n 26 . 
144 The Government 's Response to the Report of the Review Team (Department of Social Welfare, 
Wellington, May 1992), p 46 . 
145 See also s 69A of the Transport Act 1962 for a similar test in relation to heavy traffic. 
146 Sections I3E and 15 of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978 and s 18 Misuse of Drugs Act
 
1975. 
147 R v Bates [198511 NZLR 326, 328. 
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Cases in these areas
148 establish that the test is an objective one. The court looks at 
whether there were reasonable grounds for an officer to have that belief It is not sufficient 
for a court to be satisfied that the officer believed there was good cause to suspect. There 
must be objective grounds to support that belief In Goodwin v Police
149 the High Court 
allowed an appeal against a conviction for driving with excess breath alcohol. The officer 
did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the appellant had been drinking and 
driving because he had not asked the appellant if he had been drinking. 
For young people the insertion of this test means that the explanation of rights would take 
place at a later stage than at present. There are problems that would arise by the use of 
this test. It is a matter of subjective judgment on the part of a police officer as to when 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect a person of committing an offence. Each police 
officer would have a different view in different circumstances. There would not be a 
uniform approach to the time that rights are explained. Further, it is unclear what would 
happen if a court viewed the situation differently from the police officer; for instance if the 
court found that there were reasonable grounds to suspect an individual at an earlier stage 
than the police officer thought reasonable grounds existed. Would this mean that evidence 
resulting from the entire questioning would be excluded? Would it mean that evidence 
would be excluded from the time that the court believed there were reasonable grounds 
existed? 
These questions remain unresolved. As a general statement clause 31 would mean that 
questioning could occur without young people being aware of their rights. This undercuts 
section 208(h) which recognises young people as particularly vulnerable. 
(ii) Clause 31A - a discretion 
Clause 31 A was inserted by the Social Services Select Committee after submissions were 
heard. It provides that an enforcement officer is required to inform a young person of his 
or her rights in section 215 where that young person asks about them. However, the 
enforcement officer is only obliged to explain 
such of those matters as, in the circumstances of the particular case. are appropriate to the enquiry that 
was made. 
This proviso limits the explanation to those matters that the enforcement officer considers 
have been brought up by the enquiry. This certainly limits the effectiveness of the rights in 
section 215 . 
A discretion is left to the enforcement officer to decide what rights to explain to a young 
person where a request is made. The wording of the clause suggests that an objective test 
148 For instance: Sokolich v Ministry of Transport [1992] 2 NZLR 637, Noomotu v Police (1994] 1 NZLR 
181 (Transport Act 1962); 0 'Fagan v SUnreported 19 April 1994. High Court, Christchurch Registry. 
Ml07/94 (Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978); R v Sannd (1988) 6 CRNZ 323, R v Norton-Bennett 
(1990] 1 NZLR 559 (improper communication with jurors). 
149 Unreported, 7 February 1989, High Court, Palmerston North Registry. M336/88. 
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is intended ("as in the circumstances of the case"), but, it is submitted, the effect 
practically for young people faced by police officers is that the officer can decide which 
rights to explain to them. Further, even with the objective test, an officer could only 
explain the rights specifically referred to by a request and not those that would assist a 
young person. As an example, a young person, D, is not arrested (because there were not 
reasonable grounds to suspect D committed an offence) but asked to accompany the 
police for questioning. D asks whether she can call her father . A police officer could 
explain that D did have that right, and fail to tell D that she had the right to refuse to 
accompany the officer for questioning. D's request was limited to one particular right and 
that right is explained to her . Effectively a young person waives his or her rights by not 
asking about them. In Police v Kohler
150 the Court of Appeal expressly approved the 
following passage from Miranda
151 
The accused who does not know his [or her] rights and therefore does not make a request may be the 
person who most needs counsel. 
It is the most vulnerable young people unaware of their rights under the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act who will be affected most considerably by this proviso. 
The power and control is taken away from young people and given to the police. 
(iii) Conclusions about the Amendment Bill 
When the Select Committee report was tabled the Chair of the Committee Roger Sowry 
MP said152 
There was considerable debate in the committee about the point at which a child or young person should 
have their rights explained. The committee really erred on the side of strengthening the rights of children 
and young people, whilst also treading that fine balance of making sure that the police can go about their 
normal course of work. 
It is submitted that the Amendment Bill does not strengthen the rights of young people, it 
undercuts them. The Amendment Bill serves to confuse the matter still further . The 
Amendment transfers power to police discretion. Firstly the police officer decides when 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a young person has committed an offence. 
153 
Secondly, even where a young person asks about his or her rights it is the police officer 
who decides what rights that request refers to, and what rights to explain. 
Both the time when the rights are explained and the nature of the rights are changed by the 
Amendment Bill . 
150 S ee above, n 115, 123 . 
151 See above, n 59. Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966), 441-442. 
15
~ NZPD, No.5, 717, 24 March 1994. 
153 Also it is for the officer to decide whether to ask a question in order to gain an admission: this is the 
other ground in the Amendment Bill. It is submitted that in any case the police would only question with 
the intention of gaining an admission where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a young person of 
conunitting an offence. This second ground is somewhat redundant. 
38 
Janet Mackey MP was of the view that "the matter needs further discussion."
154 The Hon. 
Dr Michael Cullen said 
155 
I suspect that we may have now ended up with a somewhat more complicated procedure about w
hich there 
may be further legal arguments in the future, which will cause further difficulties in practice. 
In my view that is an astute statement. 
2. Waivers 
The second notable difference between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act is that young people cannot waive their 
rights.
156 In Canada
157 
[T]he onus is on the Crown to demonstrate that the accused decided to relinquish his or her cons
titutional 
right with full knowledge of the existence of the right and an appreciation of the consequences o
f waiving 
that right. 
The Court of Appeal have followed that reasoning. In Kohler
158 the Court of Appeal held 
that a valid waiver requires a conscious choice that is both informed and voluntary, and 
the Court noted that a voluntary waiver cannot be implied from silence. 
There is confusion surrounding what standard of proof is required to establish a valid 
waiver. In Kohler the Court of Appeal approved the test in R v Te Kira
159 and held that 
the appropriate standard for establishing a valid waiver is the balance of probability but 
"with the gravity of the issue borne in mind".
160 This, with respect, is not a clear standard 
of proof 
Waiver can be express or implied under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act but it must be 
certain, voluntary, 
161 and the "product of an operating mind". 
162 A valid waiver requires 
knowledge of the right being waived and knowledge of the degree of risk involved in 
waiving rights. 
163 
The test for a waiver involves an assessment of the understanding of a suspect. There must 
not only be understanding of the nature of the right being waived, there must also be 
154 NZPD, No.5, 724, 24 March 1994. 
155 Ib'd 1 , at page 727. 
156 See above, n 50. Also see A dams on Criminal Law, above n 87, Ch 10, pp 103-109. 
157 R v Wills (1992) 12 CR (4th) 58, 73 . 
See also Clarkson v R above, n 49 and R v Afanni en above, n 77. 
158 Police v Kohler, see above, n 115, 123 . 
159 S ee above, n 94. 
160 See above, n 115, 123 . Also see R v Dobler (1992) 8 CRNZ 604, 612 "an enhanced balance of 
probabilities". 
161 Not the result of pressure: see R v Evans (1991) 63 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC). 
162 A dams on Criminal Law above, n 88, vol 2, eh 10, p 105. A suspect must not, for example, be 
intoxicated. 
163 R v Tawhiti above, n 49 . 
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understanding of the consequences of waiving that right. It is submitted that, given the
 
purposive approach to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act taken by the courts, the 
necessity for understanding, and the trend towards age as a mitigating factor, 
164 it would 
be a rare situation where a waiver by a young person would be held to be a valid waiv
er 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
165 
Even allowing for that, by simply having the possibility of a valid waiver the New Zea
land 
Bill of Rights Act would not give young people as concrete a regime as the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act does . 
3. Breaches and admissibility 
(a) Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
The third notable difference between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Chil
dren, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act is the result of a breach. Under the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act there must at least reasonable compliance with
 the 
requirements in section 221 before a statement will be admissible. The Court of Appea
l 166 
viewed the requirement for reasonable compliance strictly to mean that the spirit of ea
ch 
of the requirements must be reasonably complied with. There is no residual discretion
 to 
admit statements as evidence. 
(b) New Zealand BW of Rights Act 1990 
In Ministry of Transport v Noort
161 Cooke P said: 
[T]he New Zealand [Bill of Rights] Act contains no ex-press pr0\1.sions about remedie
s or the exclusion of 
evidence. We have no counterpart of Article 24(1) and (2) of the Canadian Charter
168 which deal 
expressly with those matters. This difference is probably not of much consequence. S
ubject to [sections] 4 
and 5, the rights and freedoms in Part II have been affirmed as part of the fabric of N
ew Zealand law. The 
ordinary range of remedies will be available for their enforcement and protection. 
Paciocco calls this "a bold statement" and points out that there were many impedimen
ts in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act that could have inhibited access to remedies. 
169 
164 See Police v Ellis above, n 118, M unro v Police above n 11 , R v Webb (No.2) above 
n 14, R \' Tuhua 
above n 16; see also s 25(i) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act above at p 24 and p 12 o
f this paper and Art 
40 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child above n 38. 
165 This is also the approach in the U.S. Truly knowing waivers by young people are ver
y rare. See 
Representing the Child Client by MI Soler et al (Matthew Bender & Co Inc, New Yo
rk, 1990) eh 5, p 33. 
Note the study quoted in Soler (at p 33) which examined the ability of young people t
o understand their 
Afiranda warnings which found that over 50% completely misunderstood at least one
 of the four 
warnings. 
166 R v Crime Appeal (CA3 11191) above, n 71. See also R v Fitzgerald abo\'e, n 32 and th
e discussion at p 
16 of this paper. 
167 (199312 NZLR 260, 266. See generally Adams on Criminal Law above n 88, eh 10, p
p 109-121. 
168 Article 24 provides a right for persons to apply to a court for "appropriate and just" r
emedies for 
Charter breaches, and art 24(2) provides for the exclusion of evidence obtained in bre
ach of the Charter 
where its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
169 See above, n 89. Also see "Remedies for Violations of the New Zealand Bill of Rights
 Act 1990'' by 
David M Paciocco in Essays on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Rese
arch Foundation, 
Publication No.32, I 992) p 40 . 
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In R v Goodwin
170 Richardson J said that the "ordinary range ofremedies" included 
the exclusion of evidence wrongly obtained, stay of proceedings, habeas corpus, damages for fa
lse 
imprisonment and judicial review of the exercise of statutory powers. 
171 
In several cases the Court of Appeal has established that where evidence is obtained 
following a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act that evidence will be presumed 
inadmissible.
172 The evidence must be obtained in consequence of the breach. For the 
presumption of exclusion to operate, the accused must show that there is a causal link 
between the breach and the obtaining of the evidence.
173 Lack of causation often means 
that the breach is "inconsequential" or "merely technical".
174 A breach would be 
inconsequential where the evidence at issue would have been given in any event. 
175 In R v 
Grant1
76 the Court of Appeal held that the defendant's confession to burglary was 
admissible despite the fact that he had initially not been told of his right to a lawyer. It was 
admissible because when the defendant was eventually told of that right, he made no 
attempt to contact a lawyer, but instead confessed to 16 further burglaries. The Court of 
Appeal was satisfied that the defendant would have made the admissions in any event. 
A breach will also be inconsequential where the real evidence at issue would have been 
inevitably discovered. In R v Butcher and Burgess
177 certain items of real evidence found 
as a result of the defendant's admissions in a flawed interview were held admissible. It was 
accepted that they would have been discovered by the police in a search of the defendant's 
property in any case. However other items located on a country road were inadmissible 
because the police would not have searched the road were it not for the defendant's 
statement and that statement would not have been obtained were it not for the breach of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
Even if there is a causal link established by the accused, the court retains a discretion to 
admit the evidence where the prosecution satisfies the court that it would be just to do so. 
There are a number of factors that the court considers when deciding whether to exercise 
this discretion.
178 These are factors such as whether the evidence is incriminating, whether 
170 See above, n 99, 191-192. 
171 Note also the recent Court of Appeal decisions in claims from the Auckland Unemployed Righ
ts 
Centre and the Estate of Elizabeth Baigent allowing those parties to seek compensation from th
e police for 
breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act see "Court decision allows centre to sue police
" Evening 
Post, July 1994, p 2. 
in R v Goodwin above, n 99, 191; R v Butcher and Burgess above, n 95 ; R v Kirifi [1992] 2 NZ
LR 8. 
173 See R v Latta (1992) 8 CRNZ 520. It is an evidential burden. See R v Te Kira above, n 9-l , 667 
per 
Richardson J 
What is both necessary and sufficient is that there be a real and substantial connection between th
e violation and the 
obtaining of the evidence. 
174 ThesearetermsthatwereusedinRvP(Tl7619J) (l992)9CRNZ 119,135. 
175 See Ministry of Transport v Noor! above, n 167, 275 per Cooke P 
[A]t least evidence obtained after a violation should not be admitted unless the prosecution proves
 that it would be 
forthcoming or discovered whether or not U1ere had been a violation. 
116 See above, n 116. 
177 See above, n 95 . 
178 See Adams on Criminal Law above, n 88, pp 116-119. 
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the evidence is credible and whether, if admissible, the evidence would cause undue 
prejudice to the accused. 
179 There is also a suggestion that the discretion to admit 
evidence obtained as a result of a breach will be exercised sparingly, given the importance 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
180 
(c) Comparison 
It is clear that a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act will not necessarily have the 
same result as a breach of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act does. 
Evidence will not necessarily be excluded. There needs to be a causal link between the 
violation and the evidence, and, even if there is that link, the court retains a broad 
discretion to admit the evidence notwithstanding that violation. The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act remedies are based upon court discretion and the notion of fairness . 
181 
Unless there has been reasonable compliance, Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act violations do lead to automatic exclusion. The court does not have a 
discretion to admit statements despite the violation. 
In terms of comparisons it is clear that the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act takes a more protective stance to the rights of suspects than does the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act. 
C Conclusions 
It is evident that on the important issues of the time that rights are explained, the way that 
rights are explained, waivers of rights, and the remedies for breach of rights the current 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act is more protective of young people than 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is of adults. 
If the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill is enacted in its 
current form the differences on the issues of timing, waiver, and the nature of the rights 
would not be as great. It is recognised that the Amendment Bill does not remove the 
P
9 Per R v Cowie [1992] 3 NZLR 112, 118. Photographs taken by the police of the accused at the c
rime 
scene after his confession were held inadmissible because they were unduly prejudicial and placed fur
ther 
weight on his statement. 
180 See R v Edwards [ J 991] 3 NZLR 463 , 469 per Hillyer J. 
[T]he pattern of Judges in New Zealand excluding evidence which in their view had been obtained
 unfairly in 
interviews, would indicate that that would be one remedy open to the Courts. Whether that remedy
 must now be 
exercised more aggressively when it comes to violations of the Bill [of Rights Act] is a matter \\hic
h will have to be 
considered by another Comt in due course". 
But note that there is case law which suggests that failure to advise of the right to counsel woul
d not lead 
to a remedy where there is reason to believe that the suspect was aware of that right: R v YD Un
reported 
16 October 1991 , High Court, Auckland Registry. Tl46/91; R v Chase Unreported, 26 Septemb
er 1992, 
High Court, Hamilton Registry, T48/92 ; R v Thompson Unreported, 13 December 1991 , High C
ourt. 
Hamilton Registry, T72/9 l . 
181 "From Goodwin to good law·' by Don Mathias ll993] NZLJ 10, 11. If there is a reasonable possibility
 
of unfairness (in the sense of a miscarriage of justice) evidence will be excluded. 
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separate regime. It is contended that the Amendment Bill, the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act case law and the Law Commission's proposals signals a development towards a 
universal regime in the police questioning area. 
43 
VI CONCLUSION 
Mark what unvary 'd laws preserve each state 
Laws wise as Nature and as.fix 'd as Fate 
In vain thy Reason finer webs shall draw 
Entangle Justice in her net of Law 
Alexander Pope 
"An Essay on Man" 
Epistle III; Lines 187 - 190 
J. The vulnerability principle 
The Youth Law Project have said that young people need special safeguards to protect 
them when they are questioned by the police. 
182 This is because immaturity and 
inexperience place young people in a disadvantageous position. Generally young people 
are vulnerable to pressure, lack verbal fluency, are inexperienced in dealing with 
questioning and are socialised to agree with adults and authority figures. Young people 
are more vulnerable and the separate regime ensures, as far as possible, that they are 
aware of their rights . 
The Gribblehurst Park murder in 1980
183 is often used as the example for why young 
people deserve special protection when they are being questioned by the police. In that 
case after sustained questioning two young people confessed to the murder of a vagrant in 
Auckland. Scientific evidence later established that neither defendant could possibly have 
been responsible for the crime. The young people said that they had felt that the 
questioning would stop if they confessed, but not otherwise. The words of the 17 year old 
defendant in R v Wilson 
184 were similar. In that case after questioning held in a stuffy 
black room lasting nearly 6 hours, the defendant confessed to murder. The Court of 
Appeal ruled the defendant ' s confession inadmissible because it was involuntary due to 
oppression. The defendant was not availed of his right to a lawyer and his parents were 
not allowed to see him. He said that he "just wanted the questions to stop". 
The Legislature specifically recognised the vulnerability of young people when it enacted 
the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act.
185 
This paper does not dispute that young people are vulnerable in questioning situations. 
186 
Instead this paper focused on the legal framework set up to protect the vulnerable. The 
182 Report of the Review Team on the Children, fo ung Persons, and Their Families Act above. n26. 
p 
147. 
183 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 by Judge Brown, Lowell Goddard QC and
 
Simon Jefferson, (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, October 1989) at p 33. 
184 [1981] 1 NZLR 316, 321. 
185 See s 208(h) of the Act at p 11 of this paper. 
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question that was analysed was whether a separate framework continues to be necessary 
given the developments under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
2. Rigidity or necessary parentalism 
In Parts II and III of this paper the separate regime in the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act was examined and compared to the approach of other jurisdictions. At 
every turn the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act protects young people 
more fiercely than any of the overseas examples. 
There can be no waiver of the rights under the Act. Even where the police were entirely 
blameless18
7 a breach of the Act led to the exclusion of evidence. The courts have no 
residual discretion to admit evidence and have interpreted the "reasonable compliance" 
proviso so strictly that there almost needs to be total compliance for it to be "reasonable". 
Even where a young person fails to nominate an adult to be present and/or consult with 
the police are constrained; fellow officers cannot be chosen to be present. The rights set 
out in the Act are more extensive than any of the overseas jurisdictions. There is a focus 
on the young person. Young people are able to choose the adult they wish to be present. 
The adult must be someone that the young person is comfortable with; there is no 
presumption that that person should be a parent. Further, more than one adult can be 
present. That focus on the young person is also reflected in the Court of Appeal decision 
in Edge. 188 In that decision the Court held that the separate regime was intended to 
protect individuals who are young people when proceedings are contemplated, rather than 
individuals who committed offences when young people. The New Zealand police have 
initiated a practice of informing a young person of his or her rights before undertaking 
even investigative enquiries. 
All of these features of New Zealand law make it uniquely protective of young people. 
3. New Zealand Bm ~f Rights Act 1990 
The difference between the rights set out in section 215 of the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is basically that a young 
person is able to consult and have present their choice of adult and in fact can have more 
than one adult present. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act only guarantees the right to 
consult and have a lawyer present. 
The developments in New Zealand Bill of Rights Act case law suggest that the subjective 
features of a suspect would influence the way that right to consult was exercised. It could 
be broadened to include a right to consult another adult. A purposive and protective 
approach has been taken by the courts. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act also allows 
186 See research such as "Children in Court'' by Beth Wood Children (no. 11 , December 1993, Office of 
the Commissioner for Children) pp 13-14. 
180 See Police v BG (a young person) above, n 51 . The young person told the police that he was an adult. 
As a consequence he did not have his Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act rights explained 
to him. 
188 See above, n 73 . 
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for the waiver ofrights. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act case law suggests some 
interesting trends. There is a focus on understanding rights and the subjective features of a 
suspect. These trends are reinforced by the proposed changes to the common law 
suggested by the Law Commission. 
189 
If applied to young people the developments under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
suggest that rights would have to be explained in an appropriate manner and language, and 
that due to their specific vulnerability young people may be able to consult with someone 
other than a lawyer. A lack of capacity to understand the consequences of a waiver would 
limit a young person's ability to make a valid waiver, so that difference between the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
may be of no consequence. If the Law Commission's proposed changes were accepted, 
the circumstances surrounding the questioning of a young person would be vigilantly 
scrutinised to ensure reliability and fairness . 
-I. Problems with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act for young people 
Case law under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act brings it closer to the separate regime, 
suggesting that perhaps a separate regime for young people is no longer necessary. 
However there seems to be one insurmountable difference. There remains a great deal of 
confusion about what happens when there is a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act. 190 Burdens of proof, evidential onuses and the necessity for a causal link between the 
breach and the evidence obtained are all features of the case law surrounding this issue. 
There is a residual court discretion to admit a statement. Worrying trends suggesting the 
fractured approach of pre-Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act years have 
emerged . If a defendant is aware of the right to consult and instruct a lawyer (is 
"streetwise") a failure to inform of that right would not result in a statement being 
inadmissible. The statement would not be the direct result of the failure to inform of that 
right.191 
5. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill 
The Amendment Bill does not change the exclusionary remedy at the heart of the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. However it would quite dramatically 
change the power dynamic in the Act. The police would decide at what stage there are 
grounds to suspect a young person. 
192 This means that the police would have the power 
to decide when to explain the rights in section 215 of the Act. The police also have the 
power to decide which rights to explain where a young person asks about his or her rights. 
189 See above, n 3. 
190 Under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act it is clear that if there is a breach (unles
s 
there is reasonable compliance) a statement will be inadmissible. 
191 See above, n 180; R v Chase; R v YD; R v Thompson. See also R v Hemi above n 21 for a similar 
approach taken before the enactment of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. 
192 It is submitted that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act also gives police the power to decide, alth
ough 
more indirectly. At the least there must be conduct on the part of the police which induces a susp
ect ' s 
belief that he or she is unable to leave which would mean that a suspect was "arrested". Only then
 would a 
suspect ' s rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act be activated. 
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The question of whether the Amendment Bill would create more problems than it would 
solve remains contentious. 193 The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act was 
initially intended to give more power to the community. 194 It is arguable that the 
Amendment Bill undercuts this intention. By changing the timing and the nature of the 
rights under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act the Amendment would 
bring those rights closer to the regime under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
6. Conclusion 
The Children, Young Persons, And Their Families Act 1989 has dramatically changed the 
lot of young people who are questioned by the police. Previously the approach to 
regulating police interviews of the young was fractured and inconsistent. The Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act follows overseas trends but adds a distinctly New 
Zealand sense of community involvement. The Amendment Bill would dramatically 
change the power dynamic in the Act, perhaps bringing it closer to the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act regime. However, as yet, the developments in New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act case law remain tentative and the difference in the approach to a breach of the Act 
would be very disadvantageous to young people. 
The conclusion is that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act would not protect young people 
in the same way as does the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. However it 
is suggested that the separate regime may become legally no longer necessary given the 
trend reflected in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill and 
the recognition that section 215 is inevitably influenced by developments in the adult 
regime.195 
193 See for example, "Youth Justice Proposals in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Amendment Bill" by Gabrielle Maxwell in Children (No. 11 , Office of the Commissioner for Children, 
Wellington, December 1993 ,) pp 6 - 7. 
194 See "The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 - A Blueprint to be Applied to 
Adults? - A new Model of Justice" by Judge F McElrea, ,\'ew Zealand Law Conference Papers, 
(Wellington 1993), pp 231-240 . Judge McElrea argues that there has been a transfer of power to victims 
and the family through the use of the Family Group Conference. 
195 See the comments of the Review Team, above n 26, I 58 (see above n 136). 
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APPENDIX 
1. Section 215 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
Child or young person to be informed of rights before questioned by enforcement 
officer - (1) Subject to sections 23 3 and 244 of this Act, every enforcement officer shall, 
before questioning any child or young person in relation to the commission or possible 
commission of an offence by that child or young person, explain to that child or young 
person -
(a) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, if the circumstances are such that the 
enforcement officer would have the power to arrest the child or young person without a 
warrant, that the child or young person may be arrested if, by refusing to give his or her 
name and address to the enforcement officer, the child or young person cannot be served 
with a summons; and 
(b) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, that the child or young person is not obliged 
to accompany the enforcement officer to any place for the purpose of being questioned, 
and that if the child or young person consents to do so that he or she may withdraw that 
consent at any time; and 
(c) That the child or young person is under no obligation to make or give any statement; 
and 
( d) That if the child or young person consents to make or give a statement, the child or 
young person may withdraw that consent at any time; and 
( e) That any statement made or given may be used in evidence in any proceedings; and 
(t) That the child or young person is entitled to consult with, and make or give any 
statement in the presence of, a barrister or solicitor and any person nominated by the child 
or young person in accordance with section 222 of this Act. 
(2) Nothing in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section applies 
where the child or young person is under arrest. 
2. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill 
(a) Clause 31 
Child or young person to be informed of rights before questioned by enforcement 
officer - (1) Section 215( 1) of the principal Act is hereby amended by omitting the words 
" in relation to the commission or possible commission of an offence by that child or young 
person", and substituting the words "whom there are reasonable grounds to suspect of 
having committed an offence, or before asking any child or young person any question 
intended to obtain an admission of an offence". 
(2) Section 215 of the principal Act is hereby amended by adding the following subsection: 
"(3) Without limiting subsection (1) of this section, where, during the course of 
questioning a child or young person, an enforcement officer forms the view that there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect the child or young person of having committed an offence, 
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the enforcement officer shall, before continuing the questioning, give the explanation 
required by that subsection." 
(b) Clause 3 lA 
Rights to be explained to child or young person on request - (1) The principal Act is 
hereby amended by inserting, after section 215, the following section: 
"215A. Subject to sections 233 and 244 of this Act, where -
"(a) Any enforcement officer is questioning any child or young person in relation to that 
child ' s or young person' s involvement in the commission of an offence or suspected 
offence; and 
"(b) That child or young person makes any enquiry that relates (in whole or in part), or 
that may reasonably be taken as relating (in whole or in part) to any of the matters set out 
in any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 215(1) of this Act, -
that enforcement officer shall explain to that child or young person such of those matters 
as, in the circumstances of the particular case, are appropriate to the enquiry that was 
made." 
(2) Section 218 of the principal Act is hereby consequentially amended by inserting, after 
the expression " section 215", the expression "or section 215A". 
(3) Section 219 of the principal Act is hereby consequentially amended by inserting, after 
the expression " section 215", the expression "or section 2 l 5A". 
(4) Section 220 of the principal Act is hereby consequentially amended by inserting, after 
the expression " section 215", the expression "or section 215A". 
3. Section 56 Young Offenders Act 1982 (Canada) 
56. ( 1) Subject to this section, the law relating to the admissibility of statements made by 
persons accused of committing offences applies in respect of young persons. 
(2) No oral or written statement given by a young person to a peace officer or other 
person who is, in law, a person in authority is admissible against a young person unless 
(a) the statement was voluntary; 
(b) the person to whom the statement was given has, before the statement was made, 
clearly explained to the young person, in language appropriate to his [ or her] age and 
understanding, that 
(i) the young person is under no obligation to give a statement, 
(ii) any statement given by him [ or her] may be used as evidence in proceedings 
against him [ or her] , 
(iii) the young person has the right to consult another person in accordance with 
paragraph ( c ), and 
(iv) any statement made by a young person is required to be made in the presence 
of the person consulted, unless the young person desires otherwise; 
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( c) the young person has, before the statement was made, been given a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with counsel or a parent, or in the absence of a parent, an adult 
relative, or in the absence of an adult relative, any other appropriate adult chosen by the 
young person; and 
( d) where the young person consults any person pursuant to paragraph ( c ), the young 
person has been given a reasonable opportunity to make the statement in the presence of 
that person. 
(3) The requirements set out in paragraphs (2)(b), (c) and (d) do not apply in respect of 
oral statements where they are made spontaneously by the young person to a peace officer 
or other person in authority before that person has had a reasonable opportunity to comply 
with those requirements. 
( 4) A young person may waive his [ or her] rights under paragraph (2)( c) or ( d) but any 
such waiver shall be made in writing and shall contain a statement signed by the young 
person that he [ or she] has been apprised of the right that he [ or she] is waiving. 
(5) A youth court judge may rule inadmissible in any proceedings under this Act a 
statement given by the young person in respect of whom the proceedings are taken if the 
statement was given under duress imposed by any person who is not, in law, a person in 
authority. 
4. Section 30 Children's Service Ordinance 1986 
(Australian Capital Territory) 
Children not to be interviewed in certain circumstances 
30. (1) Where a police officer -
(a) suspects that a child may have committed a serious offence or an offence against the 
person or property; 
(b) believes, on reasonable grounds, that a child may be implicated in the commission of 
such an offence; or 
( c) is holding the child under restraint, 
the police officer shall not interview the child in respect of an offence or cause the child to 
do anything in connection with the investigation of an offence -
( d) unless a person who is not a child or a police officer but is -
(i) a parent of the child; 
(ii) a relative of the child acceptable to the child; or 
(iii) a barrister and solicitor acting for the child or some other appropriate person 
acceptable to the child, 
is present; or 
(e) unless -
(i) the police officer has taken reasonable steps to secure the presence of a person 
referred to in paragraph ( d); 
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(ii) it was not practicable for such a person to be present within 2 hours after the 
person was requested to be present; and 
(iii) another person (who may be a police officer) who has not been concerned in 
the investigation of an offence is present. 
(2) Sub-section (1) does not require a police officer -
(a) to permit a person whom the police officer believes to be an accomplice of the child in 
respect of the offence to be present while the child is being interviewed, or is doing 
anything, in connection with the investigation of the offence; or 
(b) to take steps to procure the presence of a person referred to in paragraph ( 1 )( d) whom 
the police officer believes to be an accomplice of the child in respect of the offence. 
(3) A reference to sub-section (2) to an accomplice shall be read as including a reference 
to a person whom the police officer believes, on reasonable grounds, to be likely to 
secrete, lose, destroy or fabricate evidence relating to the offence. 
(4) Sub-section (1) does not prevent a police officer from interviewing a child, or asking 
or causing a child to do a particular thing, where the police officer has reasonable grounds 
for believing that it is necessary to do so with out delay in order to avoid danger of the 
death of, or serious injury to, any person or serious damage to property. 
5. Section 13 Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 
(New South Wales) 
Admissibility of certain statements, etc. 
13 (1) Any statement, confession, admission or information made or given to a member of 
the police force by a child who is a party to criminal proceedings shall not be admitted in 
evidence in those proceedings unless -
(a) there was present at the place where, and throughout the period of time during which, 
it was made or given -
(i) a person responsible for the child; 
(ii) an adult ( other than a member of the police force) who was present with the 
consent of the person responsible for the child; 
(iii) in the case of a child who is of or above the age of 16 years -
an adult ( other than a member of the police force) who was present with the 
consent of the child; or 
(iv) a barrister or solicitor of the child ' s own choosing; or 
(b) the person acting judicially in those proceedings -
(i) is satisfied that there was proper and sufficient reason for the absence of such 
an adult from the place where, or throughout the period of time during which the 
statement, confession, admission or information was made or given; and 
(ii) considers that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the statement, 
confession, admission or information should be admitted in evidence in those 
proceedings. 
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(2) In this section -
( a) a reference to a person acting judicially includes a reference to a person making a 
determination as to the admissibility of evidence in committal proceedings; and 
(b) a reference to criminal proceedings is a reference to a criminal proceedings in which a 
person is alleged to have committed an offence while a child or which arise out of any 
other criminal proceedings in which a person is alleged to have committed an offence 
while a child. 
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6. Practice Notes for the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act (Police Association) 
(a) Rights before questioning 
Rights Before Questioniilg 
Police Officer SHALL explain to CtyP: 
1. May be arrested if: 
- Power of arrest wlthoat warrant; 
- Refuses details which leads to inability 
to serve summons. · 
2. Not obliged to accompany for purposes of 
qoatloning. Can withdraw agreement at 
any time. 
,/' 
3. Not obliged to make statement. NORMAL. 
4. Statement may be as.ed in evidence. cAur,oN 
5. May withdraw consent to make statement. 
6. Entitled to consult and have present 
Solicitor /no,nlnated person. 
Exceptions: 1. - DreGth/Dlood alcohol provisions. 
2. Rights vxplalned within prvvloas hoar. 
Rights upon arrest 
Police Officer shall explain to CfYP: 
1. Not obliged to make statemcznt. 
2. Statement may ~ osed in widencci. 
NORMAL 
CAUTION 
3. May withdraw consent to make statement. 
4. Entitled to consult and havcz prescznt Solicitor/nominated person. 
Excvptions: 1 Bmith/Blood Alcohol provisions. 
2 Immigration Act. 
3 Rights crxplainvd within pnrvious hour. 
Fig. 33 
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